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 2 
The effects of intra- and extra-industry networks on performance of venture 
capital portfolio firms 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the influence of intra- and extra-industry networks on firm 
performance by using data on 1264 UK venture capital (VC) backed start-up 
companies. The ventures’ network was operationalized by connecting together the 
various portfolio companies sharing the same investor. Regression results show that the 
venture’s network has a strong impact on firm’s success. Yet, whereas extra-industry 
ties are directly and positively linked to the likelihood of the venture to reach a 
successful exit, intra-industry ties exert a negative impact on companies’ performances. 
However, interaction effects show that once a firm establishes a sufficient number of 
extra-industry ties, it is able to profit from the network in its industry of operation. 
Overall, these findings show that an optimal balance of ties is achieved through a 
diverse set of connections incorporating both intra- and extra-industry ties.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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Although a venture’s network may facilitate the pursuit of new opportunities, 
provide access to innovative knowledge and hence enhance performance, it is 
increasingly recognized as not only an asset but also as potential liability that constrains 
the firms’ operations and is costly to maintain (e.g. Baden-Fuller et al., 2011; Brass et 
al., 2004; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Stam and Elfring, 2008). A better understanding 
of the conditions under which a venture’s network enhances a firm’s performance may 
thus require a contingency perspective in which the categorization of the networks is 
based on tie attributes rather than structural measures (Lorrain and White, 1971). As 
pointed out by various scholars (e.g. Dahlander and Frederiksen, 2011: 1002; Gulati, 
1995: 645; Lavie, 2006; Maurer and Ebers, 2006), while much work has focused on the 
structural attributes of the firm’s networks, surprisingly few studies have examined how 
heterogeneous ties, in particular intra- and extra-industry connections, impact the firms’ 
success. The limited empirical evidence that exists suggests that, although networks 
may enhance performance of entrepreneurial firms, not all ties do so equally (Peng and 
Luo, 2000). Thus, identifying the contingency conditions under which particular 
networks enhance or constrain venture’s success represents an important research 
agenda (Lee et al., 2001). 
In this paper we aim to contribute to previous network literature by studying 
how network capital that is embedded in the intra- and extra-industry ties of 
entrepreneurial ventures impacts the firm’s success. In the economics and  
entrepreneurship literature, a network is seen as invaluable for the entrepreneur because 
it provides access to resources, contacts and opportunities (Ahuja, 2000; Aldrich and 
Martinez, 2001; Batjargal, 2003; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Birley, 1985; Bruderl and 
Preisendorfer, 1998;  Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer, 2005; Dimov and De Clercq, 
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2006; Knack and Keefer, 1997; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Podolny and Baron, 1997; 
Stuart et al., 1999). Networks also play a pivotal role in enabling actors to discover 
opportunities (Burt, 1992), perceive and exploit them (Companys and Mullen, 2007). 
However, some researchers highlight the cost of managing networks and propose a cost-
benefit trade off associated with networks. Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) for example 
conclude that “like the tightrope walker who maintains balance by constant movements 
of his balancing pole, the successful individual or organization in today’s business 
environment may have to continuously balance the trade-off between safe (e.g. intra-
industry) and flexible networks (e.g. extra-industry).” Contributing to recent efforts to 
integrate this apparently opposing views we try to reconcile these perspectives (e.g., Oh 
et al., 2004; Stam and Elfring, 2008) building on the premise that network capital has 
contingent value (Ahuja, 2000)1.  
Therefore we propose that optimal firm performance results from a specific 
balance of intra- and extra-industry ties. Since simultaneously establishing these two 
sets of ties may involve significant trade-offs, it is relevant to understand whether they 
are complementary or duplicative (Stam and Elfring, 2008). We argue that both types of 
network provide ventures with access to distinct resources (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 
1997), and we show that the value of such access is maximized when a firm combines 
the two types of ties in a certain proportion. Once the venture departs from this optimal 
combination of intra- and extra-industry ties, its chances of being successful drop. 
However, if we consider the ties separately, it appears that extra-industry ties are more 
                                                 
1
 Ahuja (2000) argues that the nature and content of the ties, the type of outcome being studied, and the 
broader network structure within which a tie is embedded are all likely to influence the value of a tie. We 
use the nature and content of the ties as a contingency.  
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beneficial to a firm’s success than intra-industry connections.2 We argue that the 
positive effect of extra-industry ties is predominantly related to the knowledge and 
resource diversity to which these ties give access to. On the other hand, intra-industry 
ties offer resources that the venture may already possess, and with a lack of extra-
industry ties, the venture will not be able to take advantage of a brokerage position 
between the two “worlds”. 
Using a combination of secondary data, hand collected firm-level variables and 
primary sources on networks of VC-backed ventures in the United Kingdom, this 
research specifically examines how a firm’s intra- and extra-industry VC portfolio 
network centrality contributes to the success of the firm. Addressing recent calls for 
“more complex, multidimensional models that investigate the interactions between 
different types of social capital conduits” (Oh et al., 2004: 870), in particular 
differentiating between intra- and extra-industry ties (Gulati, 1995:645), we aim to 
identify the configuration of network ties that maximizes the contribution of networks 
to ventures’ success. 
 
Theory and hypotheses 
Networks can be defined both as an entrepreneur’s attempt to mobilize personal 
contacts in order to profit from entrepreneurial opportunities (Granovetter, 1985) and as 
a firm’s effort to cooperate with others in order to obtain and sustain a competitive 
advantage (Peng and Luo, 2000). Brass et al. (2004) define a network as a set of nodes 
                                                 
2
 Intra- and extra-industry ties represent a measure of network composition which refers to the types of 
actors defined by their stable traits, features or resource endowments (Phelps, 2010; Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994) whereas tie strength or weakness refers to the content of the tie i.e. the extent to which the 
actors refer to each other.  
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and the ties representing some relationships, or lack of relationships, between the nodes 
(individuals, work units, or organizations). Network structure relates to the pattern of 
relationships that exist among a set of actors, while network composition refers to the 
types of actors defined by their stable traits, features or resource endowments (Phelps, 
2010; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The content of the relationships represented by the 
ties can vary widely, and it is limited only by a researcher’s imagination (Brass et al., 
2004). Specifically, we define the network as the actual and potential resources 
available to a firm through its network of relationships (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) 
established by VC-backed ventures within the portfolio of each VC investing in the 
firm.  
Building on recent research (e.g. Dahlander and Frederiksen, 2011; Geletkanycz 
and Hambrick, 1997; Stam and Elfring, 2008) we focus our attention on the ties’ 
attributes rather than structural measures. Our focus on network attributes is based on a 
premise that, although prior work has examined the core discussion related to networks 
of entrepreneurs (e.g., McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) and the structural differences of ties 
(e.g. Stam and Elfring, 2008), this literature lacks systematic research differentiating the 
resources accessible through different types of ties, therefore acknowledging the 
heterogeneity of the connections. This study specifically examines two important 
dimensions of a firm’s network: (1) intra-industry network ties and (2) extra-industry 
ties. Following the differentiation between “internal” and “external” social capital 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002), our approach builds on the notion that intra- and extra-
industry ties provide a focal firm with access to distinct social capital resources, in line 
with Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) and Stam and Elfring (2008).  
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However, our paper departs from Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) and Stam 
and Elfring (2008) on various important dimensions. First, these authors study the 
impact of ties at the executives’ level, rather than at the firms’ level; second, their 
sample is related to publicly traded firms while our sample is composed of young firms 
operating in rapidly changing environments. Third, methodologically they assume the 
existence of external ties while we adopt specific and longitudinal measures that allow 
us to precisely identify the amount of external connections and their nature. Hence, to 
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first which specifically studies the impact of 
intra- and extra-industry ties on entrepreneurial ventures’ success. 
 
Entrepreneurial ventures’ success 
In this study we look at the effect of two types of ties, intra- and extra-industry, 
on  firm’s success. In this section we explain how we define success. 
Entrepreneurial ventures, especially in their early years, are usually cash flow 
negative or have very limited profits. Many VCs argue that valuing a start-up is more an 
art than a science but the industry agrees that the exit is the ultimate acknowledgement 
of the start-up market value and therefore its success. Therefore, considering that the 
main successful [exit] routes considered in the literature are IPOs and trade sales 
(Manigart and Wright,   forthcoming: 56), in this paper we consider the company exit as 
our measure of success. 
  
The role of intra- and extra-industry ties 
Previous studies suggest that ventures with central network positions enjoy 
several advantages that contribute to higher performances (Brass et al., 2004). Being 
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highly connected allows a firm to learn about new market conditions, strategies of 
competitors, and partnership opportunities (Powell et al., 1996) and have access to 
alternative providers of valuable resources (Tsai, 2001). However, different ties offer 
different benefits and each tie has a particular trade-off between costs and benefits 
(Baden-Fuller et al., 2011).  
In rapidly changing environments, such as the one in which entrepreneurial 
ventures are embedded in, firms increase their performances by focusing on ties that 
offer non-duplicative resources in order to gain new information and knowledge 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Duysters, 1996). For instance, biotechnology start-ups 
with networks providing access to diverse information have higher revenue growth 
(Baum et al., 2000).  Cosmopolitans - entities that are connected with different networks 
or industries - are more likely to innovate, and are therefore potentially more successful 
(Dahlander and Frederiksen, 2011). Furthermore, resource heterogeneity accessed 
through connections is an important source of success (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 
1994; Penrose, 1959; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Ring and van de Ven, 1994). 
In this light we posit that extra-industry ties, connections that span outside the 
main industry of operations of the focal firm, lead entrepreneurial ventures to succeed 
not only because they offer access to a diverse knowledge base and heterogeneous 
resources, but also because they help the firm to gain power and potential for brokerage 
opportunities. Considering that ventures should develop new routines, competencies, 
and technologies (Stam and Elfring, 2008) and that extra-industry ties facilitate access 
to complementary resources that are not available within the industry boundaries (Stam 
and Elgring, 2008), and therefore stimulate exposure to a diversity of approaches, 
perspectives, and ideas that are not well established in the focal industry (Hargadon, 
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2002), allowing the focal firm to “bring together new combinations of productive 
factors” (Low and Abrahamson, 1997: 443), extra-industry ties are very valuable for 
new ventures. In sum, extra-industry ties are more likely to lead the firm to success by 
functioning as a scanning device that allow entrepreneurial firms to detect new trends 
and asymmetries in a market faster than firms lacking such connections.  
In addition, extra-industry ties provide power, allowing a firm to diversify its 
ties across different industries and therefore avoid the control by few others who control 
critical resource exchanges (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:131). Similarly, diversifying ties 
offers the possibility to broker contacts in different industries that would probably 
otherwise be disconnected. Therefore a firm that spans contacts across industries is less 
likely to be dependent on each of these contacts, but rather other firms are dependent on 
the firm itself (Kotter, 1979). 
The advantages provided by extra-industry ties are not without costs. In fact this 
type of ties involves higher risks and coordination costs (Burt, 1992). However, we 
argue that these two disadvantages are mitigated by the presence of a common investor 
that helps to reduce transaction and coordination costs through its intermediation (Hsu, 
2006). 
Symmetrically, the main advantage of intra-industry ties is that they offer a 
cohesive environment with a common ground of behavioural rules (Coleman, 1988) and 
therefore low risk and coordination costs. Further, intra-industry ties provide industry 
legitimacy, and reduce uncertainty regarding the firm’s quality. However, VCs already 
play a strong role providing legitimacy (Stuart et al. 1999), information about the 
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quality of the firm (Sapienza et al. 1996), and an environment where failure to comply 
with the network rules is coupled with severe punishment (Burt and Knez, 1995).3  
In addition, being dependent on one main industry for connections and resources 
is likely to increase the firm’s competition over the resources; in fact competition tends 
to arise in organizations that are functionally equivalent, in that they are attempting to 
produce similar products and services for similar markets (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976).  
Therefore, from the previous discussion we hypothesize that starting from the 
assumption that entrepreneurial ventures should favour non-duplicative connections, 
extra-industry connections will be more beneficial to the firm’s success.  
H1: The VC-backed venture’s success will be positively (negatively) associated 
with extra-industry (intra-industry) ties. 
 
The optimal combination of intra- and extra-industry ties 
Recent work indicates that usually network forms are not inherently at odds, but 
rather that ties may benefit the firm but under different conditions (Rowley et al., 2000). 
For instance Baum, et al. (2000) show that increasing the number of connections 
without considering partner’s diversity can create inefficient configurations that 
generate less diverse information and capabilities at greater costs than a smaller, non 
duplicative set. Accordingly, various scholars (e.g. Burt, 2000; Provan et al., 2007; 
Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001; Soda et al., 2004; Tiwana, 
2008) demonstrate that an optimal network may be the one that combines different 
elements such as cohesion and structural holes or strong and weak ties.  
                                                 
3
 As concluded by Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) one would expect that actors would favor the safety 
provided by a dense network in situations where the risk of opportunism and the cost of malfeasance is 
high and a network rich in structural holes (e.g. extra-industry ties) in situation where trust is not an issue. 
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We argue that the effect of intra-industry ties is positively moderated by the 
presence of extra-industry ties and vice versa. Stam and Elfring (2008) argue that extra-
industry ties broaden the knowledge base of a highly central firm and increase its 
capacity to appreciate, recombine, and apply the knowledge that is accessible through 
its intra-industry ties (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Put simply, ventures with high 
intra-industry centrality and extensive extra-industry ties occupy a unique brokering 
position that enhance their capability to recognize information asymmetries in the 
market and connect seemingly unrelated facts into novel combinations (Burt, 2000; 
Hargadon, 2002). Exposure to new ideas and resources via extra-industry ties may 
outweigh any conformist pressures coming from intra-industry ties (Perry-Smith and 
Shalley, 2003). In addition, being directly tied to other fields makes highly central firms 
less dependent on industry peers for access to new knowledge and resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). These ventures are able to verify and triangulate information 
received from competitors and VCs with information received through bridging ties, 
thereby enhancing their access to high-quality information that facilitates the pursuit of 
innovative, high-risk - high-reward opportunities (Stam and Elfring, 2008) that are 
necessary to achieve an outstanding success. Hence, we argue that a firm has to 
carefully balance its portfolio of ties in order to combine intra- and extra-industry ties. 
 
H2a: Intra- and extra-industry ties complement each other in enhancing the 
firm’s success. 
H2b: There is an optimal network portfolio composed of a set of intra- and 
extra-industry ties which leads to the firm’s success. 
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METHODS 
Research setting 
The empirical context of this study is the UK venture capital industry during the 
period 1995-2011. The VC industry is an interesting context because it involves the 
financing of new or radically changing firms which are different in many important 
ways to mature, established companies quoted on the stock markets (Wright and 
Robbie, 1998). VCs usually operate in private finance markets that are often 
characterized by a low liquidity and information frictions (Bengtsson and Hand, 2011). 
In this context, networks prove to be useful in reducing information asymmetries, 
enhancing performance through access to crucial resources and conferring legitimacy. 
Although networks may play important roles in overcoming such knowledge and 
legitimacy challenges, most research has looked at established industries (Aldrich and 
Fiol, 1994; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). The UK market has been chosen 
because, although it is the biggest in Europe (EVCA, 2010) and the third most attractive 
worldwide for this type of investments (IESE, 2010), it has received considerably lower 
attention than the US market (with research by Abell and Nisar (2007), Chiplin et al. 
(1997), Filatotchev, Wright and Arbeck (2006), Manigart and Wright (forthcoming) 
being notable exceptions). 
  
Research design and data collection 
 We collected data from multiple sources to establish the validity of our 
measures. First, we conducted a qualitative study using field interviews with portfolio 
firms and venture capitalists (VCs), archival data and a literature review to explore 
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possible impact of portfolio companies on each other.4 Based on theoretical and 
qualitative evidence, we argue that there are strong links between VC portfolio 
companies. Companies with a common VC investor may exchange experiences and 
knowledge, rely on the economies of scale in dealings with suppliers and have cross 
company directorships which may impact their operations. The importance of this type 
of networks is highlighted by entrepreneurs and investors such as InvestorLab, Kleiner 
Perkins Caufield and Byers, Rocket Internet, Intel Capital, First Round as well as by 
scholars (e.g. Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999).  
We started with interviewing 3 VC backed entrepreneurs and 3 VCs and we 
gathered secondary data using VC websites among other secondary sources.5 Online 
resources taken from VC websites (e.g. iGlobe, First Round Capital, Intel Capital, 
Rocket Internet, Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers-KPCB) illustrate the existence and 
importance of portfolio company ties. For instance, KPCB, one of the leading US VCs, 
emphasizes on its website6: “Entrepreneurs gain access to our matched portfolio of 
companies and associations with global business leaders. These relationships are the 
foundation for strategic alliances, partnership opportunities and the sharing of insights 
to help build new ventures faster, broader and with less risk”. Further, our interviewees 
                                                 
4
 This approach has been proven to be fruitful in the network literature by other scholars such as Gulati 
(1995), Powell et al. (2005), Soda et al. (2004), Stam and Elfrig (2008) and Uzzi (1996). For example 
Gulati (1995) uses interviews in 8 firms to confirm the relevance of his research and Uzzi (1996) refines 
his framework based on interviews and fieldwork. 
5
 Although our main quantitative analyses and data collection is UK based, we conducted interviews also 
with non-UK based VCs and entrepreneurs and extensively reviewed online resources worldwide. We 
believe that this procedure does not confound our findings as the western VC standards are common 
throughout the different markets. 
6
 http://www.kpcb.com/contactUs/ , quote retrieved on 28th of July 2011. 
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explained that two practices are common in the industry in order to foster networking 
among portfolio companies: CEO/CFO mailing lists and CEO summits. 
In addition, various scholars have demonstrated that common third parties (e.g. 
common VC investor) serve as an incentive to display cooperative image (Burt and 
Knez, 1995; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2008; 
Stuart et al., 1999 Uzzi, 1997).     
Further, Powell et al. (1996) and Barringer and Harrison (2002) suggest that 
collaborations in high-tech industries typically reflect more than just a formal 
contractual exchange and are often stipulated with social contracts rather than legal 
agreements. Therefore, based on theoretical and practical evidence, we posit that VCs 
can create an environment where collaborations between their portfolio companies can 
blossom, but these collaborations are often informal and not legally binding.  
Once we established the existence of these links among portfolio companies we 
gathered VC investment data through the Thomson One Banker database. The database 
contains the same information as Venture Expert which has been extensively used in the 
VC literature (Chaline et al., 2012; Gompers, 1995; Hochberg et al., 2007; Lerner, 
1994). We included UK based venture companies that received the first VC investment 
between 1995 and 2008 with records of investments up to the end of 2011. Following 
the approach used by Hochberg et al. (2007), we did not include companies that 
received their first investment after the 2008 to allow ventures sufficient time to 
successfully exploit their potential, or eventually fail. On the other hand, the analysis 
starts in 1995 because prior to this year the Venture One database does not provide a 
comprehensive coverage of the UK market. 
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 In line with Manigart and Wright (forthcoming), we focused our attention on 
“young growth oriented venture capital backed companies” that therefore received 
investment from seed to later stage, therefore excluding buyouts, real estate investments 
and generally private equity deals. For additional refinement, borrowing from Zahra 
(1996), we defined new ventures as firms that have been in existence for eight years or 
less at the time of investment. We also did not consider companies that received 
investments exclusively from “undisclosed investors” or “individual investors” because 
this does not allow us to locate the venture within a VC network. The final dataset 
contains 1264 VC-backed companies, 5344 VC deals made by 733 VC firms. After 
additional data collection and manipulation, we created a panel of precise network 
measures for each venture in each year. 
Network construction 
The database has been initially rearranged to create a matrix of 1264 companies 
per 733 VCs per 17 years, totalling 15.7 million data points. Venture Expert divides the 
portfolio companies according to their status: previously or currently VC backed. For 
previously VC backed companies we hand collected a date and type of exit through 
multiple database sources such as Zephyr, SDC Platinum, MergerMarket and Venture 
One. However, when the venture was listed as “Currently VC backed” and there was no 
evidence of exit or bankruptcy from other databases, we assumed that the VC is still a 
shareholder in the company. Finally, if the company’s exit was coded as “went public”, 
“acquisition”, “merger” and at the same time it was not VC backed, an exit date has 
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been calculated in relation to the stage of the company following Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989)7. 
Subsequently, in line with our field research and our theoretical underpinnings, 
we redesigned the network as portfolio-company to portfolio-company matrix. This 
generated a matrix with 1264 companies and 17 years totalling around 27 million data 
points. Connecting portfolio companies with each other through a common link with a 
VC is similar to the network validated by Venkatraman and Lee (2004) that connected 
game developers through video-games consoles.  
 
Measures 
 Performance. As previously mentioned, the company trade-sale or IPO is a 
strong acknowledgment by the market about the company value. Hence, in line with the 
VC literature our dependent variable of success is represented by a VC exit (e.g. 
Hochberg et al., 2007). This performance measure is considered to be the most 
appropriate because, due to the high levels of technological and R&D intensity of the 
firms in our sample, accounting performance measures may be misleading, especially 
during early stages. Therefore, an exit is a clear and objective way to assess the 
entrepreneurial firm’s performance and the success of the venture capital investments 
(Cumming, 2007). IPOs and acquisitions are widely regarded as the best exit outcomes 
for both the company and the VC (Abell and Nisar, 2007; Cumming et al., 2006; 
Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Manigart and Wright, 
                                                 
7
 We assumed that early stage investors reduce the amount of time devoted to companies in the seed 
stages after 8 years, in the early stages after 7 years, for companies in the balanced and later stages after 3 
years. 
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forthcoming; Megginson and Weiss, 1991).8 With regard to acquisitions, it has to be 
noted that this type of exit is not always financially rewarding but we argue that it is a 
good proxy for value for both the company and the shareholders. Therefore in order to 
test our hypotheses we used a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the venture has been 
acquired, merged or went through an IPO in a given year.9 
 Intra- and extra-industry ties. In order to test our hypotheses we developed two 
measures that represent the amount of ties that each venture has in (a) the industry of 
operations (intra-industry ties) and (b) in external industries (extra-industry ties). The 
two variables are constructed taking into consideration 6 macro industries identified by 
the Thomson One database: Computer related Communication and Media, Non-High 
Technology, Biotechnology, Seminconductors/Other Electrical and electronics, 
Medical/Health/Life Sciences. The choice of the above classification comes from two 
main reasons: (a) there is a generally even distribution of companies among the six 
categories compared to more fine-grained segments; and (b) using more precise industry 
measures reduces the likelihood of a firm to have a connection with a company in the 
same industry; in fact, even using only 6 industries a single company on average has 
less than 1 connection in the same industry and 2.5 connections in unrelated industries 
each year. Based on this industry classification, we developed two distinct matrices for 
                                                 
8
 An IPO is not strictly an exit at the time of the public offering since some of the VCs’ equity may be 
held after an IPO within a lock-up period. However, an IPO still allows VCs to cash in a significant 
portion of their pre-IPO equity and get their portfolio firm recognized by public market investors as a 
successful venture.  
9
 For example if the firm is in the network from 2000 but went through an IPO in 2003, our performance 
variable will have 0s from 2000 to 2002, and a 1 in 2003. Within our dataset, 30% of the companies have 
been acquired, merged or went through an IPO while 7.5% failed. The ratio between write offs and 
successful exits is in line with the one identified by the British Venture Capital Association for the last 
available years at the time of this paper (4 years). 
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each year for each venture representing the ties among the various portfolio companies 
with a common investor. Therefore, if two companies share the same investor in a given 
year, they belong to the same network. In addition, the ties have been divided in intra- 
and extra-industry based on whether the connections are in the same or in different 
industries with regard to the focal company. Hence, each venture in any given year of 
its life has two set of connections: intra- and extra-industry connections. We then 
created an interaction effect by multiplying the intra- and extra-industry network 
variables in order to test our hypothesis 2a. 
  In addition, to test hypothesis 2b we include two different but related measures:
 Concentration of ties. We include a concentration index that helps us to better 
understand the best combination of ties. We create an index based on the following 
Herfindahl formula, where S represents the proportion of ties in each network, we 
created yearly concentration measures of ties. Therefore if a firm in a given year has 
only intra- or extra-industry ties, rather than a combination of the two, will have a 
concentration measure of 1. Similarly, if it has 50% ties in each of the networks, this 
index will have a value of 0.5. 
  
 Proportion of ties. Finally, in order to shed additional light on the optimal 
concentration of ties as suggested in hypothesis  2b, we calculated the proportion of 
intra- and extra-industry ties based on the following equation where C is the 
concentration of ties both for I (intra-industry ties) and E (extra-industry ties) 
 and  
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Further, we tested the robustness of our findings with alternative measures of networks 
such as betweenness, Bonacich power and eigenvector generated for both types of 
networks (for a detailed discussion of these measures see Bonacich, 1987; Borgatti et 
al., 2002; Freeman, 1977; Hochberg et al., 2007 ). 
 Control variables. To ensure the robustness of our findings and to rule out 
alternative explanations we include a number of controls. Brander et al. (2002) find that 
syndication is associated with higher returns. Therefore, we include the Number of co-
investors in each venture over its life.10 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show that returns are 
persistent across a sequence of funds managed by the same VC firm. Hence it can 
happen that older VC are more reputable and therefore invest in more successful 
ventures within their portfolio and this could create a similar bias to the one previously 
mentioned (Podolny, 2001). Therefore, we include the VC Experience which is 
represented by the logarithm of the total number of companies invested in to date by the 
lead investor11. In addition we also include dummies that classify the Stage of the VC 
fund investing in the company (i.e. Early stage, Balanced Stage, Later Stage, Other). 
Further, we check whether the lead VC fund is UK based (dummy with value 1 if UK 
based) and whether the fund and the portfolio company have their headquarters in the 
                                                 
10
 To control for the effect of syndication we follow the definition of Lockett et al. (2006) that defined  an 
equity syndicate as two or more venture capital firms taking an equity stake in an investment for a joint 
payoff, either in the same investment round or at different points in time (Brander et al., 2002). 
11
 This measure is calculated for each venture from the inception of the lead VC to the time of the first 
investment in the portfolio company. An option to include VC measures considering the lead investor 
only is suggested by Gorman and Sahlman (1989). They theorise that when VCs play a lead investor role, 
they devote much more time than non-lead or late-stage investors, and they invest in every round with a 
bigger amount of capital overall. Hence, we identified a lead investor as the first VC to invest in the 
company. We do not have data about the investment for a reasonable number of companies to check the 
effective size of the investment. In unreported tests we also controlled for VC age and results are 
consistent. However, due to collinearity issues, we could not include both measures simultaneously. 
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Same city (dummy with value 1 if in the same city). These measures are likely to 
account for the potential networking spillovers generated by the VC proximity that it is 
known to be relevant in the VC investments (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Sorenson and 
Stuart, 2001). Further, to control for market conditions we gathered from the World 
Federation of Exchanges the yearly net amount of listed companies on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE)12. Control measures related to the ventures include dummies for 
the Industry of operations, the Age at financing and the dynamic Age. For example if a 
venture is 12 months old at the time of the VC investment in 2005, the Age at financing 
measure will be 12 all over the company’s life. Differently, the dynamic Age will be 12 
in 2005, 24 in 2006, 36 in 2007 and so forth. 
 
 Analytical methods 
In order to test our hypotheses we run a longitudinal logistic regression with random 
effects that tests the impact of our predictors on the likelihood of a venture to have a 
successful exit. The fixed effect model using dummy variables to control for firm or 
time differences is not appropriate since some explanatory variables are time-invariant 
(Gulati, 1995: 652; Hausman and Taylor, 1981).13 Further, as reported by Lincoln et al. 
(1996) OLS gives inefficient estimates of slopes and (negatively) biased estimates of 
standard errors with pooled cross-section/time series data because it fails to take into 
account the error components common to the same firms in different periods and 
different firms in the same periods. Therefore, the random effects model applied to a 
logistic regression is the most appropriate estimation technique. Further, we 
                                                 
12
 This measure represents the new listings minus the de-listings. 
13
 As a robustness test we run a model with fixed effects including only time varying measures. The 
results of this test are explained in the next sections. 
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standardized our network measures of around the Z-score to avoid high inter-item 
correlations among the interaction terms (Gao, Gopal, & Agarwal, 2010). Therefore the 
variables Intra- and Extra-industry ties have been standardized and after this procedure 
we interacted the variables following Friedrich (1982). 
  
Results 
 Table 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics and correlations. Within our 
sample more than 74% of the firms had the lead investor based in UK and 20% of the 
companies were located in the same city of their investor. With regard to the fund stage, 
the sample is approximately evenly spread within the 3 stages: early (42%), balanced 
(28%) and later (21%), with just a few companies in “other” stage (7%)14. The most 
represented industry sectors are “Computer Software and Services” and “Internet 
Specific” which represent almost half of the firms. Further, the average firm received 
the first VC investment 31 months after the inception from 3 VCs co-investing together, 
with a maximum of 22 firms co-investing in Oxagen Ltd. The average age of the 
company in our panel is 5.7 years. With regard to the networks’ size we can see that the 
results are highly skewed. In fact, even though the average is 1 and 2.4 for intra- and 
extra-industry connections respectively, the maximum amount of connections is 39 and 
83. Finally, on average 56 new companies have been listed on the London Stock 
Exchange every year. 
 
----------Table 1 and 2 about here---------- 
                                                 
14
 This measure is related to the stage of the VC fund, but it can be considered a proxy for the stage of the 
company as well. This measure is conceptually different from the Age since not all companies need the 
same time to reach the same stage of development.  
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 Table 3 reports results of the logistic regression. At the first step we entered the 
control variables. Not surprisingly, in hot market conditions (LSE) ventures have higher 
probabilities to reach a successful exit. Further, in line with the literature, although not 
significant in this model, VC experience positively impacts the success of the firm. 
Moreover, even though older ventures have higher probability of exiting successfully, 
the earlier the firm receives its VC investment, the higher its likelihood of success. 
Finally, geographical proximity with the investor, in terms of city but not country, has a 
strong impact on the successful exit of the venture. 
 
----------Table 3 about here---------- 
 
In the second step we entered our main independent variables to test our 
hypotheses. H1 suggests that the venture’s success will be positively (negatively) 
associated with extra-industry (intra-industry) ties.  In model 2 we find support for this 
hypothesis since the extra-industry ties’ coefficient is positive and highly significant (p 
< 0.001) and intra-industry ties’ coefficient is negative and significant (p < 0.05).  
In the third step we test our H2a that posits that there is a positive interaction 
effect between ties. Put simply, the higher the amount of one type of tie, the higher the 
benefits received from the other ties, and vice versa. In model 3 we include the 
interaction effect between the two types of networks and we find that is positive and 
highly significant (p < 0.001). Therefore we demonstrate that the two types of networks 
complement each other as hypothesized in H2a. 
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In the last steps (models 4 to 5) we test H2b that predicts that the optimal 
portfolio of ties is composed by both types of ties. In model 4 we insert the measure that 
represents the concentration of ties. If our hypothesis is supported this variable has to be 
negative, showing that the higher the concentration of ties, the lower is the firm’s 
likelihood of success. Hence, since the coefficient is negative and highly significant (p < 
0.001) we find support for H2b. Further, in order to shed additional light on the optimal 
portfolio composition, in model 5 we introduce the proportion of intra-industry ties and 
its squared measures. In unreported analyses we tested the impact of the proportion of 
extra-industry ties. Since both squared measures are negative, we conclude that a 
diversified set of ties is preferable, and the optimum combination is centred around 
extra-industries connections.15 
Looking at the overall fit of each of the models indicated by their log likelihoods 
and associated Wald chi-squares, it can be noted that the introduction of the amounts of 
ties in model 2 significantly improves the fit of the base model. Another significant 
improvement occurred in models 3 with the introduction of the interaction effect. 
Finally, there is a notable improvement in model 4 and 5 compared to model 2, with the 
introduction of the variables for concentration of ties, and the proportion of each type of 
ties. Fig. 1 summarizes these main effects showing the impact of our independent 
variables, the combination of the two and their proportion on the likelihood of success. 
In all the graphs, the y-axis represents the likelihood of having a successful exit. 
 
----------Figure 1 about here---------- 
 
                                                 
15
 Note that we cannot include in the same model both proportion of ties as they are symmetric. 
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 The top graph in Figure 1 shows the impact of intra- and extra-industry ties on 
companies’ performance. Clearly, the higher the amount of connections outside of the 
focal firm’s industry, the better the performance. On the other hand, connections in the 
same industry hinder firm’s performances. The graph in the left corner of Figure 1 
illustrates that once a firm moves away from a balanced set of connections its 
performance will be affected. Similarly, as previously discussed (right corner graph), a 
balanced combination of ties is preferable over a concentrated distribution. It can be 
noted that once a firm has a portfolio with more than 40% of intra-industry ties, it will 
have lower chances of success. On the other hand, a firm that goes over a proportion of 
extra-industry ties of about 60% will reduce its likelihood of success. Hence, the best 
combination of intra- and extra-industry ties seems to be approximately 40/60% 
respectively. 
 
Robustness tests 
 We conducted several robustness tests. First, we run different specifications of 
the model using panel regression (xtreg) and we obtained similar results with the 
directions and significances of the main effects remaining constant. In addition, we run 
a fixed-effect model without the time invariant measures, and the direction of the 
coefficients is consistent but the significance is lower. Further, we re-run the same type 
of regression but instead of using a raw amount of ties we included more elaborate 
measures such as betweenness, eigenvector and Bonacich power created from intra- and 
extra-industry matrices. In addition, we also “weighted” the connections between firms 
by the geographical distance between the two ventures; in all these tests we had the 
same direction of the coefficients although we found lower statistical significance for 
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our measures. Finally, in order to rule out the possibility that more successful firms 
become more connected (a reverse causality argument), we lagged our network 
measures by 2 years, and the results remain unchanged and statistically significant.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 This study reveals that the configuration of intra- and extra-industry networks 
can explain both positive and negative performance of a firm. We provide empirical 
support to arguments by Podolny and Baron (1997) and Peng and Luo (2000) and 
demonstrate that not all ties and networks have the same impact on performance. 
Although the total amount of ties has a positive effect on performance, we demonstrate 
that different ties have different impacts. First, extra-industry ties give access to new 
information and knowledge (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Duysters, 1996) and, in 
turn, increase company performance. This finding shows that in innovative and dynamic 
contexts firms gain more benefits from accessing novel knowledge which is likely to be 
found outside the industry of operations rather than from simply increasing the number 
of ties.  
 Second, young firms backed by VCs do not benefit directly from intra-industry 
ties. We argue that, in this context, the VC is a strong mediator of the resources that a 
venture gains in its industry, therefore mitigating the network benefits. However, as 
highlighted by Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) and Baden-Fuller et al. (2011), networks 
are costly to maintain and in our case it appears that these costs are not offset by the 
intra-industry network advantages. However, we also find that, once a venture manages 
to connect with an extensive amount of firms outside its industry, it is able to profit 
from the connections in its industry of operation as well. Put differently, although the 
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intra-industry network taken independently has a negative impact, once a venture 
establishes a critical mass of extra-industry ties, it is able to benefit from its intra-
industry ties. Figure 1 illustrates that the processes behind the impact of ties on shaping 
company performance are not straightforward, and there is an optimal combination of 
ties that involves both types of connections. We posit that, in order to thrive, a new firm 
needs to have a richer set of ties which provides access to different types of resources 
and opportunities. 
 
Contributions 
 Research has only started to recognize and systematize the value of knowledge, 
technologies, and partners located in different industries (Enkel and Gassmann, 2010). 
Within this field of research, this paper provides several contributions. First, we show 
empirically that the effects of intra- and extra-industry ties on firm performance are 
different but inextricably linked. Taken in isolation, intra-industry ties do not seem to 
offset the cost of managing them. However, once they are coupled with extra-industry 
ties, it looks like a firm manages to profit from both types of ties. Hence, we show that 
different ties mutually shape their contribution to firm performance. The fact that intra-
industry centrality and extra-industry bridging ties have complementary effects on 
ventures’ success provides initial empirical support for recent research arguing that 
internal and external social capital may have interactive effects (Mehra et al., 2006; Oh 
et al., 2004; Stam and Elfring, 2008). Supporting the notion that social capital has 
contingent value (Ahuja, 2000), in particular in relation to the nature and content of the 
ties, this study shows that different network configurations shape the effect of networks 
and that different types of networks affect each others’ value. The results highlight the 
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need to examine not only the interactions among different forms of social capital, but 
also the contingencies that determine the optimal balance of ties. 
 Second, this paper also advances literature pointing to the “dark side” of social 
capital (Baden-Fuller et al., 2011; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000). The results emphasize 
that by simultaneously examining different types of networks, we offer a better 
understanding of the conditions under which network centrality is detrimental to 
performance. Previous research has shown that firms can become over embedded in 
cohesive networks of strong ties (Uzzi, 1997). Accordingly, as suggested by Stam and 
Elfring (2008), over-embeddedness can also be viewed as an imbalance between 
internal and external social capital. This idea suggests that considering a firm’s 
embeddedness only in one network may generate misleading results due to overlooking 
other types of networks. Borrowing from Stam and Elfring (2008) we examined the 
optimal configuration of a firm’s ties across multiple networks and showed that a 
balanced set of ties, with a stronger presence of extra-industry ties, is needed to succeed 
in an entrepreneurial setting. 
 Third, we contribute to the long standing debate between closure (Coleman, 
1988) and structural holes (Burt, 2001). In line with Burt’s argument we show that a 
firm that has access to different industry segments gains new knowledge, and with this 
background can profit from its intra-industry network centrality. However, we show 
that structural holes are important not only because they connect unconnected firms, but 
also because they connect unconnected industry segments. Future research may look at 
the differences between structural holes that connect companies in the same or unrelated 
industries. 
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 Lastly, although the importance of networks in the VC world has been 
demonstrated, we believe that this is the first attempt to assess the value of the 
connections that a firm have access to through a portfolio of VC-backed companies. 
Consistent with the view that VCs provide more than capital, we find that investors add 
value to their investee companies, providing a fruitful environment for collaboration 
among their companies. This finding is supported by both archival data and by 
interviews with VC managers. In practice, venture capitalists promote a vibrant 
environment organizing recurring summits where all the portfolio companies are 
invited, by linking these companies directly, and by creating databases that connect the 
CEOs and CTOs of their companies for a joint problem solving. We extend the VC 
literature that advocates the value adding activities provided by the VCs (for an 
extensive review see Manigart and Wright, forthcoming). Contributing to this research 
we show that VCs provide access to a potentially valuable network composed by their 
portfolio companies. However, not all companies benefit from all the connections but 
rather it is important to establish the right links within this network.  
 
Limitations and directions for future research  
 Our results have several implications for the current debate on the relationship 
between networks and success. However, we would like to acknowledge some 
limitations and recommend caution when extracting conclusions, and suggest the 
importance of future research on the topic. The main limitation of this research is that it 
cannot demonstrate whether an alliance has been really established or that a VC 
effectively initiated a collaboration between portfolio companies. However, according 
to Powell et al. (1996) exploratory study, the official partnerships are just a small 
 29 
portion of the entirety. Similarly, Hite (2005) argues that embedded ties are generally 
governed through informal mechanisms of relational governance such as trust and 
relational contracting rather than through more formal mechanisms of market 
governance such as contracts (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Williamson, 1979; 
Zaheer and Venkataraman, 1995). Further, as it has been mentioned by VCs and 
entrepreneurs that we have interviewed, only a small portion of these collaborations is 
contractualized and that the VC is “a small world governed by trust”. Therefore, if we 
would consider only the joint ventures publicly communicated, we would lose all the 
other indirect information and resource exchanges that are fundamental to the success of 
the new firms. However, further research could include more fine grained networks’ 
measures, for instance combining official alliances with measure of informal 
collaborations. In addition considering the highly significant personal networks of VCs 
and entrepreneurs, both formal and informal, would offer interesting insights.  
 Further, our network measure is based on horizontal firm differentiation (e.g. 
different industries); hence we do not control for ties spanning across vertical sectors. 
For example, would the intra-industry ties effect be the same if the two companies 
operate in different points of the value chain? Or maybe this type of ties provide the 
same, if not higher, benefits than extra-industry ties? A useful extension of this research 
would examine both intra- and extra-industry ties, as well as vertical versus horizontal 
ties. 
 Furthermore, a very interesting avenue for future research is represented by the 
different degree of network effectiveness contingent on the life cycle of the firm. In 
their conceptual paper, Hite and Hesterly (2001) postulate that the networks of 
emerging firms evolve in response to the changing resource’s needs and acquisition 
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challenges of the firm as it moves through the life cycle stages of emergence and early 
growth. This dynamic network evolution is the process by which firms strategically 
adapt and align their networks to gain the resources they need to ensure successful 
emergence and early growth (e.g. Golden and Dollinger, 1993; Ostgaard and Birley, 
1994). Therefore, testing the contingent effect of resource availability accessible 
through intra- and extra-industry networks and life cycle of the firm is a promising 
extension of this study. In fact, it can be hypothesized, borrowing from the resource-
based notion, that firms cooperate in order to gain access to critical resources and 
considering that older firms pari passu have higher resources, they will gain less benefit 
from wider networks.  
 Moreover, we looked at the success of the venture in reaching a positive exit. It 
would be interesting to see what is the impact of different types of ties on innovation, 
and as well how innovation shapes the network configuration of a firm. For example, 
are new ventures more inclined to partner with an innovative firm in their industry 
rather than with an outsider? 
 Finally, we considered only one market, the United Kingdom, in one particular 
context, the VC industry. This leads us to concerns about generalizability of our 
findings. It would be interesting to understand the impact of different networks of 
portfolio companies in other markets, potentially taking into consideration institutional 
factors. This network can be centred in other countries or take into account cross-
country relationships. Therefore testing whether institutional factors such as IP 
protection or cultural factors have an impact on this knowledge sharing is an interesting 
question that we leave unanswered.  
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Practical implications 
Possible limitations notwithstanding, the present research offers several practical 
implications. The findings reveal that entrepreneurs can enhance the performance of 
their ventures by simultaneously increasing the amount of extra-industry ties and at the 
same time connecting with ventures in their industry. Yet, entrepreneurs should be 
aware that a strong balance in favour of intra-industry ties may constrain performances 
when an intra-industry centrality is not accommodated by sufficient extra-industry 
bridging ties. Considering this potential trade-off between building different social 
capital conduits, an important challenge for entrepreneurs concerns balancing their 
efforts at strengthening their intra- and extra-industry networks simultaneously and 
strategically. Entrepreneurs are encouraged to support initiatives that may foster the 
development of intra-industry ties, but at the same time, the findings suggest that such 
networking activities may be costly to manage and do not provide the expected benefits 
if are not complemented by initiatives that support the creation of extra-industry ties. 
Further, in addition to considering the different value adding activities and resources 
offered by a VC, when approaching investors the entrepreneurs should look at what 
companies they can gain access to through their investors to be; companies may be 
better off by selecting VCs that focus on diverse industries so that they obtain financing 
from highly specialized VCs but at the same time accessing opportunities with portfolio 
companies in different industries. Symmetrically, VCs should invest in new ventures 
not only for their potential, but also for their network that may in turn benefit their 
portfolio companies. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Successful exit 0.0511 0.220 0 1 
Intra-Industry ties 0.9320 3.052 0 39 
Extra-Industry ties 2.4371 7.315 0 83 
Co-investors 3.0694 2.782 1 22 
Age at Financing 31.2573 23.521 0 84 
VC/Venture=City 0.1957 0.397 0 1 
UK Fund 0.7466 0.435 0 1 
Early Stage 0.4216 0.494 0 1 
Balanced Stage 0.2871 0.452 0 1 
Later Stage 0.2179 0.413 0 1 
Other Stage 0.0734 0.261 0 1 
Computer SW 0.2046 0.403 0 1 
Internet 0.2082 0.406 0 1 
Communication 0.0903 0.287 0 1 
Consumer 0.0628 0.243 0 1 
Other Products 0.0994 0.299 0 1 
Industrial 0.0507 0.219 0 1 
Biotechnology 0.0906 0.287 0 1 
Computer HW 0.0270 0.162 0 1 
Semiconductors 0.0663 0.249 0 1 
Medical/Health 0.1000 0.300 0 1 
VC experience 1.8359 0.781 0 3.87 
LSE 56.8070 193.624 -211 492 
Venture’s Age 5.7053 3.196 0 19.25 
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Table 2. Correlation among the main variables 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Successful exit 
            
2 Extra-industry 0.01 
           
3 Intra-industry 0.00 0.68 
          
4 Interaction 0.01 0.70 0.81 
         
5 Concentration -0.03 0.20 0.06 -0.02 
        
6 Proportion of ties 0.00 0.34 -0.02 0.08 0.42 
       
7 Co-investors 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 
      
8 Age at Financing -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.00 
     
9 VC/Venture=city 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 
    
10 UK Fund -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.11 0.04 0.25 
   
11 VC Experience 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.07 -0.16 -0.12 
  
12 LSE 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.20 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
 
13 Venture’s Age 0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.58 -0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.15 
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Table 3. Random Effects Panel Logistic regression. Dependent variable: Successful exit 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Control Variables      
 Co-investors -0.03* (0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
 Age at Financing -0.02*** (0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
 VC/Venture=City 0.27*  (0.14) 
0.29** 
(0.14) 
0.30** 
(0.15) 
0.29* 
(0.15) 
0.29** 
(0.15) 
 UK Fund -0.24*  (0.13) 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
-0.24* 
(0.13) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
 VC Experience 0.11 (0.07) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
 LSE 0.00** (0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 Venture’s Age 0.25*** (0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
0.03) 
0.26*** 
0.03) 
0.26*** 
0.03) 
Network measures      
 Intra-Industry†  -0.17** (0.08) 
-0.40*** 
(0.12) 
-0.39*** 
(0.12) 
-0.37*** 
(0.12) 
 Extra-Industry†  0.19*** (0.06) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
 Interaction Intra*Extra†   0.07*** (0.02) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
 Concentration of ties†    -0.25*** (0.07)  
 Proportion of Intra-industry 
ties‡     
2.80*** 
(0.77) 
 Proportion of Intra-industry 
ties2     
-3.28*** 
(0.96) 
 Constant -3.803***    (0.58) 
-3.752***    
(0.58) 
-3.163***    
(0.40) 
-4.01*** 
(0.41) 
-4.44*** 
(0.49) 
      
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Fund stage dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi-square 95.8*** 102.71*** 105.43*** 105.88*** 107.47*** 
Log likelihood -1417.2 -1413.3 -1409.1 -1401.6 -1401.0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. †Measures centralized around the Z-score. In unreported 
analyses the proportions of extra-industry ties has a coefficient of 3.76***(1.3) and its squared 
measure -3.28***(0.96). 
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Fig. 1 Main network effects 
